

Secure communications in quantum networks

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Quantum communication is the art of transferring quantum information between distant locations

Encoding on properties of quantum states of light

Propagation in optical fibre or free-space channels

Information processing in network nodes (processors, sensors, memories)



Security

Untrusted network users, devices, nodes

Efficiency

Optimal use of communication resources

Applications

Demonstrate provable quantum advantage in security and efficiency for communication and information processing tasks


Functionalities and applications

Prepare-and-measure QKD, coin flipping, oblivious transfer, position-based cryptography, digital signatures

Device-independent QKD, certification and verification, secret sharing, conference key agreement, anonymous communication

Quantum money, secure multiparty computing, leader election

Blind, delegated and distributed quantum computing, distributed quantum sensing, byzantine agreement



Trusted node

Entanglement

Quantum memory

Quantum processors


Stages of quantum networks

Modern cryptography relies on **assumptions on the computational power** of an eavesdropper

→ **symmetric, asymmetric, post-quantum** cryptography


Quantum key distribution allows for **exchange of sensitive data** between **two trusted parties** with **information-theoretic, long-term security** guaranteed against an all-powerful eavesdropper

→ combined with suitable **authentication** and **message encryption** algorithms




Key information is encoded on photonic carriers

Analysis of errors due to Eve's perturbation leads to extraction of secret key



- No cloning theorem:** Eve cannot copy the states sent by Alice
- Heisenberg's uncertainty principle:** Eve cannot measure in both bases
- Device independence:** If Alice and Bob share entangled photons **less assumptions on devices**
- Practical security:** Deviation from security proof may lead to **side-channel attacks**









Performance of **point-to-point**, **prepare-and-measure** fibre-optic QKD systems

ED *et al.*, npj Quant. Info. 2016



Fundamental **limits in rate and range**

Security: $\frac{1}{2} \|\rho_{S_A S_B E} - \tau_{SS} \otimes \rho_E\|_1 \leq \varepsilon$ for any $\rho_{A^n B^n E}$


Light is :	Discrete  Photons	Continuous  Wave
We want to know :	their Number & Coherence	its Amplitude & Phase (polar) its Quadratures X & P (cartesian)
We describe it with :	Density matrix $\rho_{n,m}$ 	Wigner function $W(X,P)$ 
We measure it by :	Counting: APD, VLPC, TES... 	Demodulating : Homodyne Detection  $V_1 - V_2 \propto X = X \cos \theta + P \sin \theta$
« Simple » States	Fock States	Gaussian States

BB84, Decoy state, COW, DPS, MDI

One or two-way, Gaussian or discrete modulation, coherent or squeezed states, post selection, MDI




Gaussian, QPSK, QAM,...



Single (homodyne) or double (heterodyne) quadrature detection

Trusted (calibrated) noise







Composable, finite size security proof for Gaussian modulation
 Adapted to [arbitrary discrete constellations at asymptotic limit](#)

A. Leverrier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 2015, 2017
 A. Denys *et al.*, Quantum 2021





Compatibility with technology and **digital signal processing techniques** used in **coherent telecom systems**

Probabilistic constellation shaped 64 and 256-QAM, dual pol., Nyquist pulses, 50% QPSK pilots, 400 Mbaud, 10 kHz linewidth




With 256-QAM, secret key rate
92 Mbit/s @ 9.5 km
24 Mbit/s @ 25 km

Si receiver photonic chips from C2N and CEA-LETI
 InP transmitter chips from HHI-Fraunhofer



Clearance	Linearity	Bandwidth	Efficiency
>20dB @ 1MHz	97-99 %	200-250 MHz	18-28 %
>20dB @ 10MHz			
>10dB @ 100MHz			
>5dB @ 200MHz			



Si-PIC CV-QKD receiver platform

Y. Piétri *et al.*, OFC 2023


Key distribution is central primitive in the **trusted** two-party security model
 In other configurations many more **functionalities**

Unforgeable quantum money


Wiesner's original idea (1973) of using the uncertainty principle for security

But needs quantum verification and is not robust to imperfections
 Was considered impossible to implement

New protocol with **classical verification** and **'BB84' states**
 Based on **challenge questions**




$$S_{pair} = \{|0, +\rangle, |0, -\rangle, |1, +\rangle, |1, -\rangle, |+, 0\rangle, |+, 1\rangle, |-, 0\rangle, |-, 1\rangle\}$$



Probability of answering the bank's challenge correctly

→



Rigorously satisfies security condition for unforgeability

→ quantum advantage **with trusted terminal**




General security framework for **weak coherent states** and anticipating **quantum memory**

→ minimize losses and errors for both trusted and untrusted terminal

Allows **two distrustful parties** to agree on a random bit, whose value **should not be biased**

Classical → computational assumptions, **quantum** → information-theoretic security but fundamental lower bound on bias

In principle **arbitrarily close to zero** for weak protocol, where Alice and Bob have a preferred outcome



Photon number entanglement with heralded single photons, **conditional verification step**

Quantum advantage in the form of cheat sensitivity **maintained over a few kilometres**

Proof-of-principle **verification of multipartite entanglement** in the presence of dishonest parties



W. McCutcheon *et al.*, Nature Commun. 2016

$$|GHZ\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle|0\rangle|0\rangle + |1\rangle|1\rangle|1\rangle)$$

Requires very **high performance resources**
Limited loss tolerance


Application to **anonymous message transmission** and **electronic voting**
Verification phase guarantees anonymity and privacy

A. Unnikrishnan *et al.*, Phys. Rev. Lett. 2019
 F. Centrone *et al.*, Phys. Rev. Applied 2022



To counter inherent range limitation due to optical fiber loss → terrestrial and satellite-based networks

Practical testbed deployment allows for interoperability, maturity, network integration aspects and topology, use case benchmarking, standardization of interfaces



Y.-A. Chen *et al.*, Nature 2021

Trusted node networks

Alice-R: key1, R-Bob: key2, R: key1 \oplus key2

→ Bob: key2 \oplus (key1 \oplus key2) = key1

For end-to-end security, routing of entanglement with quantum repeaters and memories



EuroQCI

- Link in progress
- Operational Link
- Operational Quantum Node
- Quantum Node in progress
- - - Satellite link



Data centre storage and interconnection, protection and resilience of critical infrastructures, governmental communications, finance, telecom operators, medical file transfer


Benchmarking with commercial systems

IDQ XGR QKD systems

Thales Mistral encryptors



THALES




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Deployment of quantum memory-based link
Cold atom technology with record high storage-and-retrieval efficiency


Deployment of CV-QKD integrating system-on-chip technology and of entanglement distribution



exail




They **alleviate the need for long chains of trusted nodes or quantum repeaters**
 They **serve more use cases**: remote, isolated or inaccessible locations
Terrestrial and space networks work together and can be **fallback options**






Downlink channel with turbulence
Probability distribution of transmission efficiency
Payload characteristics of Micius:
 pointing error 1 μ rad, divergence angle 10 μ rad
Ground station characteristics of Matera Laser Ranging Observatory: telescope diameter 1.5 m

Security analysis for a fluctuating channel \rightarrow **fading introduces additional noise**
 Trade-off between binning of data to reduce variance and finite-size effects

Refined analysis of fibre coupling with adaptive optic system \rightarrow **correcting up to 15 orders optimal** for both CV and DV-QKD, for LEO at almost all conditions





Analysis of **entanglement-based scenario**

Trade-offs between **visibility time, losses, divergence, pointing, telescope size, atmospheric turbulence, detector efficiency,...**

Importance of **long simulation duration**

Quantum communication networks will be part of the future **quantum-safe communication infrastructure**

Such an infrastructure can address a range of **use cases** with high security requirements in **multiple configurations**

The **quantum communication toolbox** is rich and increasingly advanced

Quantum technologies need to integrate into **standard network and cryptographic practices** to materialize the **global quantum network vision**

Thank you!

Y. Piétri, M. Schiavon, L. Trigo-Vidarte, D. Fruleux, A. Rhouni, F. Roumestan, A. Ghazisaeidi,
M. Huguenot, B. Gouraud, A. Leverrier, P. Grangier
V. Marulanda Acosta, C. Lim, J.-M. Conan, D. Dequal
V. Yacoub, L. Martins, S. Neves, R. Yehia, F. Centrone, P. Lefebvre, I. Supic, D. Markham, I. Kerenidis